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There is a growing concern that inter-state disparities in India
have been increasing since the advent of economic reforms in India
whereas economic performance at the country level has been
improving. At the national level, as K.C. Pant observes, “…the
process of economic reforms taken up in earnest by us since 1991
has yielded rich dividends from a situation of crisis at the turn of the
decade, today India is one of the ten fastest growing economies in
the world…” (Howes et. al., 2003, p. 27).  He also argues that for the
reforms to pick up momentum, states would have to take the lead.
The mid-term appraisal of the Ninth Plan as well as the Tenth Plan
showed concern about disparities among states.  The Tenth Plan
argues that “A major task that the country has to undertake in
response to this challenge during the Tenth Plan is to narrow down
these disparities” (GoI, 2002b; Vol. III; p. 123).  Acharya (2002) puts
it differently and argues that fiscal strain in states and lack of reforms
are speed-breakers in the way of India’s medium-term growth
prospects.  It has been highlighted by Ahluwalia (2002) and later
endorsed by Shetty (2003) that inter-state inequalities have been
increasing in India. Agarwal (2004) has noted that food-surplus states
like Uttar Pradesh are growing at slower pace while food-deficient
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states are growing at higher and accelerated pace since the 1990s.
Dholakia (2003) has also stressed the regional disparity in economic
performance and argues that in terms of economic and human
development there has been decline in regional disparities. 
 
On the whole, the focus has been on orienting and
implementing economic reforms at the state level in such a manner
that lagging states are also able to develop quickly.  It has been felt
that reforms at the state level were ignored initially.  This needs to be
corrected with the participation of the centre and other concerned
agencies.  Fiscal position of the states has deteriorated since late
nineties as indicated by the revenue deficit of all the states, which
remained at less than 1 percent of GDP up to the mid-nineties and
started increasing to reach more than 2 percent in recent years.
Similarly, gross fiscal deficit of the states as a ratio of GDP increased
from below 3 percent to above 4 percent in the same period.  In the
face of growing fiscal crisis across the states, it was realised that this
must be given importance over other issues so that particularly
backward and more crisis-ridden states like Uttar Pradesh can orient
their fiscal strategies to put their finances in order and provide
support to growth. This could also be used to energise the dormant
economic forces that can be instrumental in attracting private
investments at a pegged-up level. 
Uttar Pradesh is a huge state having one-sixth of the
population of the nation. By virtue of being the top-ranking state of
India in terms of population, it has the maximum representation in
Parliament of  80 members, i.e., it constitutes almost 15 percent of
the Lok Sabha. Uttar Pradesh is also politically privileged as it has
given eight prime ministers to the nation so far who have ruled the
country for more than four decades in the parliamentary history of
more than five decades. However, it is also true that Uttar Pradesh
has been lagging behind the other states of the country. Its economic
prospect is not very encouraging. Even the role of the state does not
seem to be defined with sufficient force and direction. Evidence of
this ambiguity can be found in the internal structural constraints of the
fiscal measures being pursued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh.
This paper endeavours to establish a relationship between budgetary
constraints and poor economic growth in Uttar Pradesh.  The present
paper comprises five sections. In section-II, we try to present a broad
growth scenario of the state economy as well as the status of socio-
economic development. Section-III attempts to deal with the fiscal
scenario of Uttar Pradesh wherein broad trends are analysed
regarding pattern of expenditures, resource mobilisation, and
indebtedness while in section-IV indicators of fiscal discipline and5
efforts to introduce reforms for better results are reviewed. The last
section tries to derive growth imperatives of the fiscal scenario and
also reach some policy conclusions.
II. Economic Performance of Uttar Pradesh
Indicators of Development
Since any effort through planning or fiscal strategies is aimed
at raising the level of development, both social and economic, it is
desirable to begin with a discussion of the status of development in
Uttar Pradesh, vis-à-vis, all India and the most progressive states.
We are not comparing it with other parts of world for the simple
reason that targets established by the progressive states of the
Indian economy itself would require a great deal of sustained effort
for the state to match. Table-1 illustrates the backwardness of Uttar
Pradesh in absolute as well as relative terms. Demographically, Uttar
Pradesh is one of the most backward states of India as birth rate is
very high; infant mortality rate is not declining at a desirable pace;
literacy rate is still far from satisfactory; and life expectancy is low
because of high IMR and high crude death rate. Going through
economic parameters, it is discerned that per capita income in Uttar
Pradesh is very low. It is 54 percent of the all-India average and only
38 percent of the highest per capita income among the states in
2001-02. The reason can be traced to both poor economic
performance and high population growth in the state. Per capita
consumption of electricity was less than half of the national average
in 1999-2000 and is just one-fifth of Punjab. Area under commercial
crops in Uttar Pradesh is around 16 percent of the total cropped area
while it is as high as 59 percent in Gujarat. The situation is more
unpalatable in the industrial sector, which is far behind the national
average. At a time when other states are improving the growth rate of
industrial sector, this sector shows signs of fatigue in Uttar Pradesh
even before it could have any significant achievement. Thus, the
state is characterised by poor social and economic infrastructure, low
output, low human development index, and high incidence of poverty
and unemployment. All these might be attributed to inadequate
capital stock in the economy as well as lack of sustained investments
through either public or private sectors.6
Table: 1: Indicators of Development: Uttar Pradesh, 
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Table: 2: Trend Growth Rate of State Income in Uttar Pradesh
(At 1980-81 prices; per cent per year)
Sectors   1980-81 1990-91    1993-94
    to     to         to  
      1989-90 1999-00 2001-02
#
1.  Agriculture & animal husbandry    2.74    2.27    2.52
2.  Forestry & logging  -23.79   -1.00  25.32
3.  Fishing   13.21    6.64    7.45
4.  Mining & quarrying    2.93    5.74    9.58
A.  Primary sector    2.46    2.36       3.20
5.  Manufacturing   10.40    7.04    2.02
  (a)  Registered manufacturing   14.80    7.71    0.11
  (b)  Unregistered manufacturing    5.49    5.90    4.71
 6.  Construction    1.34    3.57   11.73
 7.  Electricity, gas & water supply   16.43   -1.97   -4.61
 B.  Secondary sector     8.25     5.76        4.21
 8.  Transport, commu. & trade    4.12    4.38    4.35
 9.  Finance & real estate    8.98    6.30    4.11
 10.  Community & social services    8.05    4.69    6.02
 C. Tertiary sector    6.33    4.94    4.76
Net state domestic product    4.79    4.04    4.03 
Population    2.36    2.15    2.33
 Per capita NSDP    2.38    1.85    1.66
#   At 1993-94 prices.
Source: Based upon data from the bulletins of State Income Estimates published by
Economic & Statistics Division, State Planning Institute, Uttar Pradesh.
Pattern of Economic Growth
The year 1980-81 was a turning point in the Indian economy
as the pace of economic growth and development picked up and a
reasonable growth rate of well above 5 percent was realised. Annual
growth rate of the national economy improved from 5.4 percent in the
1980s to above 6 percent in the following decade. Thus, it is obvious
that at the national level growth prospect has improved. Surely, this
aggregate performance must have derived its strength from various
states that would have contributed to it. However, Uttar Pradesh
seems to have moved in an unexpected direction. A review of the
growth scenario of Uttar Pradesh since 1980-81 (Table-2) reveals
that annual trend growth rate of the net state domestic product
(NSDP) was 4.79 percent during the decade of the 1980s. This
growth rate was lower than what was obtained at the national level.
Even this growth rate could not be maintained afterwards. The trend
growth rate at 1980-81 prices has been 4.04 percent during the
period of 1990-91 to 1999-2000. If we estimate it at 1993-94 prices,
the growth rate has been the same (4.03 percent) for the period8
1993-94 to 2001-02. Consequently, growth rate of per capita income
has also been lower at 2.38 percent in the 1980s and below 2
percent in the following period.
1  Here, the negative role of population
growth is evident. More than half of the economic achievement in this
slow growing economy is getting neutralised owing to high population
growth rate of above 2 percent.
A comparison of performance during the last two five year
plans reveals that the growth rate of the national economy was 6.7
percent in the Eighth Plan period (1992-97), declining to 5.5 percent
in the Ninth Plan period (1997-2002). However, in the state economy,
growth rates in the respective plans have been 3.2 and 3.0 percent
only, i.e., half of the achievement of the national economy. In the
opening year of the Tenth Five Year Plan, i.e., 2002-03, growth rate
of the state economy has been just 0.3 percent
2 as against a target of
8 percent. In similar economic conditions, the Indian economy grew
by 4.2 percent despite large slippages. This resulted in the ratio of
per capita income of Uttar Pradesh to that in India deteriorating
further from 65.9 percent in 1993-94 to 54.2 percent in 2001-02 and
the contribution of the state to the national income declining from
10.3 percent to 8.8 percent during the same period. These facts can
be further corroborated when we compare per capita income of Uttar
Pradesh to the state with the highest per capita income. The distance
is widening without interruption as the ratio declined from 53.3
percent in 1980-81 to 42.6 percent in 1996-97 and further to 38.0
percent in 2001-02. On the whole, performance of the state
economy,  vis-à-vis, Indian economy and other states has been a
matter of disappointment because while some states have been
improving their economic and social performance, Uttar Pradesh has
been losing ground.9
Table 3: Trend Growth Rate of Gross Domestic Product in India










Agriculture and allied    2.92 3.10    3.20
Primary    3.22    3.40    3.40
Manufacturing    7.34    7.07    6.87
Electricity, gas and water supply    9.21    6.26    7.87
Secondary    6.60    6.71    6.52
Transport, storage and communication    5.79    8.18    6.73
Tertiary    6.85    7.93    7.13
Gross domestic product    5.38 6.11    5.69
Note:  Based upon data from National Accounts Statistics of India: 1950-51 to
2000-01; EPW Research Foundation, Mumbai; 2002.
Sectoral behaviour in Uttar Pradesh suggests that the
adverse trends cut across the sectors. Sectoral composition of the
state economy is such that in 2001-02, the share of the primary
sector was 36.9 percent in the NSDP while the share of the
secondary sector, stagnant since the mid-nineties, was 21.4 percent
in 2001-02. The tertiary sector became the largest sector with a
share of 41.7 percent. Structural backwardness of the state economy
becomes clearer in comparison, as the three sectors shared 26.1,
24.4 and 49.5 percent respectively in the GDP of India in 2001-02.
Moreover, weakening forces of growth are evident from Table-2 as
the secondary sector's growth rate declined from 8.25 percent in the
eighties to 5.76 percent in the nineties and further to 4.21 percent in
the period of 1993-94 to 2001-02. This has been basically due to the
fact that growth in the registered manufacturing sector came to a
grinding halt and the infrastructure activities, mainly electricity, gas,
and water supply, have been showing negative growth in recent
years (-4.61 percent during 1993-94 to 2001-02) in contrast to a
robust growth in the eighties (16.43 percent). Tertiary sector has also
been showing weaker performance as the growth rate declined from
6.33 percent in the eighties to 4.76 percent during 1993-94 to 2001-
02. In the primary sector, agriculture's performance remains poor and
stagnant. However, fisheries, mining and quarrying do show some
improvement. Contrary to state economy, in the national economy all
the three sectors have shown better performance in the nineties as
compared to the eighties (Table-3). On the whole, the growth process
in the state economy is getting weaker leading to marginalisation in
the national perspective as well as poor economic prospect within the
state economy.10
It is a matter of serious concern that the economy is not
getting sufficient inducement to move on to a higher growth path,
which becomes self-sustaining. This shows that there are bottlenecks
in the economy that need to be removed through various initiatives of
the government. Such efforts might take various shapes viz., policy
strategy, plan strategy, and fiscal measures. In fact, these are
required to mobilise the forces of growth in the desired manner. This
is equally relevant in the changed economic scenario in the country
after 1991. Eventually, we have to look into the role of fiscal
measures being adopted by the Government of Uttar Pradesh to
energise the lagging economy. However, before going in to this issue
we should examine plan efforts in Uttar Pradesh and other
parameters where role of fiscal strategy becomes relevant, directly or
indirectly.
Plan Expenditures in Uttar Pradesh 
It is argued that the planning process has helped the Indian
economy in accelerating its growth performance. As a consequence,
larger private investment also flows in to supplement the initiatives of
the plan investments. That is, plan and other public investments are
expected to generate ‘crowding in’ effect.  Therefore, in the plan
strategy, public sector investment is kept at high level to have direct
and indirect inducement effects. Keeping this in mind, we can also
analyse the pattern of plan investments in the Uttar Pradesh
economy. A brief examination of the per capita plan investment
shows that it has always been lower than that for all states’ average
(Table-4). The ratio of per capita plan expenditure in Uttar Pradesh to
that of all states taken together was around 65 percent in the first two
plans and it increased rapidly to 93.0 percent in the Fourth Plan. But
thereafter, there has been a decline in the ratio throughout and it
came down to 73.0 percent in the Eighth Plan. In the Ninth Plan, the
decline has been sharper (59.1 percent). What has been more
alarming is the fact that the ratio declined to 54.0 percent in the Tenth
Plan even though it has been estimated from outlay only. The same
trend can be observed further if we estimate the share of total plan
expenditure in Uttar Pradesh to that at the all-India level. This ratio
was the highest at 7.8 percent in the First Plan and became 7.4
percent in the Fourth and Fifth Plans. But thereafter, there has been
regular slippage and it has been the lowest in the Ninth Plan at 4.0
percent and in terms of even outlay, the ratio slipped further to a low
of 3.7 percent when the state has one-sixth of the country's
population.11



































First 25 38 65.8 12.3 7.8
Second 32 51 62.7 11.0 5.0
Third 72 92 78.3 13.3 6.5
Fourth 132 142 93.0 15.2 7.4
Fifth 329 361 91.3 14.5 7.4
Sixth 588 718 81.9 13.3 6.0        35.5
Seventh 1077 1270 84.8 13.7 5.5        26.9
Eighth 1528 2144 73.0 11.5 4.5         59.6
Ninth 1766 2988 59.1 9.5 4.0 62.0
@
Tenth





Note  @  Plan Outlay.
Source Plan Documents and Statistical Diaries of Uttar Pradesh.12
Thus, it is obvious that Uttar Pradesh has not been able to
mobilise resources for plan investments and the relative share is
deteriorating very fast. Now, if we look at Table-5, it is further
affirmed that not only in relative sense, but also in absolute terms,
plan investments in the state are not forthcoming to the extent it is
claimed at the beginning of a plan. There has been a trend of big
gaps. This trend is quite evident since the Ninth Five Year Plan
(1997-2002). Plan investment envisaged for the Ninth Plan could not
be realised fully as there was a huge gap of above 32 percent. As a
result, in the last two years, outlays were reduced. However, the
gaps persisted. 
Table 5: Plan Expenditures in Uttar Pradesh

























































































Source:  Plan documents, Statistical Diaries and Budget documents of Uttar Pradesh.
Notes: * Originally, the Tenth Plan outlay was fixed at Rs. 84,233 crore. But after
assessment by the Planning Commission of India, it was found that due to resource
constraint in Uttar Pradesh, it must be Rs. 59,708 crore. Still, the overall size of
investment in the state economy was maintained at Rs. 3,64,645 crore,i.e., private
investment level has been pegged up from Rs 2,80,412 to Rs 3,04,937 crore.
#: At 1992-93 prices; ##: At 1996-97 prices; *: At 2001-2002 prices.
$: At current prices.13
The Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-07) has had to face rough
weather from the stage of formulation. A total plan investment (public
and private together) has been fixed at Rs. 3,64,645 crore. Out of
this, initially it was proposed that the public sector investment would
be at Rs. 84,233 crore. However, it got finalised at only Rs. 59,708
crore while not changing the overall plan investment. Indirectly, the
private sector would have to accept the enhanced responsibility.
Worse, the state plan outlays for the first three years of the Tenth
Plan aggregated at only Rs. 23,478 crore, i.e., 39 percent of the total
public sector outlay. Even these are unlikely to be realised. In such a
situation, it is unrealistic to argue that the remaining investments
would be forthcoming in the last two years of the Plan. Here, it needs
to be pointed out that nominal plan outlays would go up if we adjust
for price changes, as the plan outlays are determined at constant
prices.  Such a precarious situation in the state economy reflects
upon growth and development mainly owing to paucity of funds. This
is more pronounced since the mid-nineties or since the Ninth Plan.
This is not helpful in even removing backwardness, social and
economic; any discussion of taking the economy on a higher growth
path remains largely academic.
3
III. Fiscal Constraints
Since the decade of the nineties, fiscal health of almost all
the state governments deteriorated with variation only in degree. The
problem has a compounding effect, deeply scarring economies
where fiscal health has not only become very weak and directionless
but also economic growth has either been halted or highly
moderated. These also tend to have low ranking in terms of human
resource development, the major thrust area in the second leg of
economic reforms.  All these characteristics find simultaneous
existence in Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, analysis of fiscal constraints
operating in this economy assumes significance.  In this section, we
discuss the fiscal scenario in Uttar Pradesh, which shows regular
deficits and lack of consistency in other areas over the years as far
as its role in growth, development, and direction is concerned. The
problem in the state economy seems to be deep-rooted while having
structural overtones as well. These have their reflections in the
budget formulation and fiscal strategy and we can analyse the issues
accordingly.14
Environment of the Budget Formulation
The significance of a budget lies in the seriousness and
philosophy it embodies. There are various indicators to suggest that
budget preparation is gradually becoming a mere ritual in Uttar
Pradesh. There has been unprecedented political instability in Uttar
Pradesh since the nineties; either there has been President's rule or
frequent change of governments. In a situation of ad-hoc coalitions,
the government tried to play safe and avoided all policies that might
have gone against any section of population that was influential in the
immediate context. The net result was that no meaningful strategy
could be devised. Besides, lack of commitment about budgetary
approach as a tool of economic development is reflected in
presenting a budget as per convenience of the ruling party/coalition.
Often, the budget in Uttar Pradesh is not presented in February or
March. More than this, budget is not discussed adequately in the
Assembly and passed without debate. Keeping in view
developmental perspectives, it seems that political parties in Uttar
Pradesh lack clarity of vision and commitment towards this annual
exercise. Moreover, it is also becoming a practice not to appoint any
full-fledged Minister to look after the finances of the state. As a tool of
political power, most of the time budgets have been presented by
Chief Ministers themselves who could not lend sufficient thought and
time to the budget and state finances.  There is no mechanism to
properly monitor and enforce budgetary guidelines and the spirit of a
budget often gets vitiated owing to lack of proper administrative
system.  On the whole, the scenario also reflects poor governance in
Uttar Pradesh.
Fiscal Scenario
It is a common refrain that the fiscal scenario has worsened
across states. However, the deterioration has been serious in Uttar
Pradesh where even envisaged plan outlays are nowhere near being
met. Despite tall claims and high targets, resource constraints have
limited plan expenditures and this has resulted in continued slide
down of plan expenditures/outlays in the national context. Therefore,
it is obvious that in Uttar Pradesh, growth and development are
seriously threatened on account of fiscal constraints. We now
analyse fiscal trends mainly since the mid-nineties and try to find out
how the situation can be reversed in this most populous and
backward economy so that the budget plays a pivotal role in inducing
investment realisations on a sustained basis.15
Revenue Account
Table-6 reveals that revenue deficit has persisted in Uttar
Pradesh for quite some time. Since the mid-nineties, the deficits have
swollen, as they have been more than 3 percent of the GSDP. Since
2002-03, there seems to be some improvement but it is too early to
be sanguine. In the year 2003-04, this ratio jumped up to 9.4 percent
owing to an extraordinary situation of adjustment of government
underwriting for a loan of Rs. 12,277.40 crore for the erstwhile
UPSEB as a measure of power sector reforms. Even if this
component is ignored, still the ratio of revenue deficit to GSDP is 3.6
percent. Therefore, it is difficult to suggest that sustained
improvement in revenue deficit has been achieved in recent years.
There are two broad components of revenue deficit, i.e., revenue
receipts, and revenue expenditures. It can be seen (Table-6) that the
receipts have been very low since the mid-nineties, but some
improvements are visible in the present decade, subject to further
analyses. As far as revenue expenditures are concerned, these have
been at a higher level in the present decade after remaining relatively
stable for most part of the 1990s (around 15 percent).
An examination of annual changes in revenue receipts points
towards lack of consistent effort to mobilise resources in the state
economy whereas growth of revenue expenditures could not be
checked. In this context, while ignoring the amount of Rs. 12,277.40
crore mentioned earlier, the increase of expenditures by 23 percent
in 2003-04 is a matter of concern. Nonetheless, it is to be
acknowledged that since 1999-2000, the size of the revenue deficit
has been shrinking. The Tenth Finance Commission had categorised
Uttar Pradesh among the "high fiscal stress states" as its ratio of
revenue deficit to revenue expenditure was above 17 percent.
However, now it appears that the state has been making efforts to
come out from the high stress category as the ratio has been 19.5,
15.5, 18.9 and 12.9 percent in the years 2001-02, 2002-03, 2003-04
and 2004-05 respectively, which seem to be getting below the
threshold barring the year 2003-04 (even after ignoring the UPSEB
loan adjustment).16
   Table 6: Revenue Receipts & Expenditures in Uttar Pradesh (Rs. crore)



















1990-91 8310.2 15.0 9538.5 17.2 -1228.3 -2.2 -12.9
1991-92 9674.6 15.0 10399.2 16.1 -724.6 -1.1 -7.0
1992-93 11676.2 16.5 12690.7 17.9 -1014.5 -1.4 -8.0
1993-94 12131.4 13.8 13280.1 15.1 -1148.7 -1.3 -8.6
1994-95 13393.2 12.9 15396.0 14.9 -2002.8 -1.9 -13.0
1995-96 15215.2 13.1 17555.8 15.2 -2340.6 -2.0 -13.3
1996-97 16028.6 11.8 19207.7 14.1 -3179.1 -2.3 -16.6
1997-98 17571.1 11.7 22175.0 14.8 -4623.9 -3.1 -20.9
1998-99 17378.7 10.1 26074.9 15.2 -8696.2 -5.1 -33.9
1999-00 21495.1 11.6 28747.7 15.5 -7252.6 -3.9 -25.9
2000-01 24743.3 14.2 31032.6 17.8 -6289.3 -3.6 -20.3
2001-02 25597.9 14.9 31779.7 18.5 -6181.3 -3.6 -19.5
2002-03 27821.2 13.6 32938.5 16.1 -5117.3 -2.5 -15.517




















(RE) 32860.1 15.5 52798.1
# 24.9
# -19938.0 -9.4 -37.7
2004-05





Note: Receipts /GSDP and Expenditure /GSDP ratios since 1999-2000 have been estimated by the author. The GSDP 
figures have been obtained from budget documents where it was implicit in the revenue deficit / GSDP ratios.
#: Revenue expenditure includes adjustment of government underwriting a loan of Rs 12,277.40 crore for the erstwhile 
    UPSEB.18
Table 7: Annual Change in Revenue Receipts, Expenditures 
and Deficit in U. P. (percent)
Year Receipts  Expenditure Deficit
1990-91 … … …
1991-92 16.4 9.0 -41.0
1992-93 20.7 22.0 40.0
1993-94 3.9 4.6 13.2
1994-95 10.4 15.9 74.4
1995-96 13.6 14.0 16.9
1996-97 5.3 9.4 35.8
1997-98 9.6 15.4 45.4
1998-99 -1.1 17.6 88.1
1999-00 23.7 10.3 -16.6
2000-01 15.1 7.9 -13.3
2001-02 3.5 2.4 -1.7
2002-03 8.7 3.6 -17.2
2003-04 (RE) 18.1 60.3
(23.0)
289.6
2004-05 (BE) 13.4 -19.0
(5.6)
-72.3
Note: - Figures in parentheses  represent annual change if we estimate after
adjusting for Rs 12,277.40 crore in 2003-04 for government underwriting  the
loans of UPSEB.
Source: - Based upon Table 6.
Revenue Expenditures
Committed or contractual expenditures claim such a large
part of total expenditures in Uttar Pradesh that it leaves almost no
scope to pay attention towards more rewarding items. The worst was
in 1998-99 when expenditures on salary, pension, and interest
payment exceeded the total revenue receipts (Table-8). Thereafter,
there has been some moderation. Nonetheless, the pattern of decline
has not been smooth. Moreover, the pace of decline has been slow;
as per budget estimates for 2004-05, the ratio is expected to be 80
percent. This may be broadly attributed to two factors: the first is the
slow growth in revenue receipts and the second relates to the nature
of the expenditure that cannot be brought down substantially in a
short time. 
It is noteworthy that in the last five years, annual increase in
the salary expenditure has been much below 5 percent, a threshold
outlined for states to control their revenue expenditure. However, in
2003-04, it went up by 16.2 percent, which could not be corrected in19
the ensuing budget as it is further expected to increase by 2.1
percent. However, there are reasons to believe that the salary burden
is getting stabilised in the medium-run. Nevertheless, the state has
been sweating it out to reduce the revenue deficit by at least 5
percent per year as required by the Eleventh Finance Commission to
become eligible for incentive transfers in order to prune their revenue
deficits.  Pension and interest liabilities are unlikely to be reduced
significantly in the medium-term.  Pension liability is estimated to
increase at a fast pace in future as it increased by 5 percent in 2000-
01, and then 10.6 and 15.0 percent in the following two years.  But
the pace peaked in 2003-04 (29.9 percent) and still does not show
any sign of comfort in the budget of 2004-05 (15.9 percent).  Annual
growth rate of interest payments on the borrowings by the state
further accelerated and peaked in 2003-04 (52.7 percent).  In 2004-
05, interest burden is expected to further increase by 6.4 percent.
Thus, instead of being contained as per expectation of several fiscal
control devices, at least pension and interest payments are not
showing any sign of moderation in the burden.  Given this scenario,
the state budget is not able to spend sufficiently on other priority
items or for investments. 
Revenue Receipts
Considering the inelastic nature of revenue expenditures
prevailing in the last several years, it is stressed that to minimise and
later eliminate revenue deficit altogether and to bring a situation of
revenue surplus in Uttar Pradesh, revenue receipts of the state must
increase rapidly. But it has already been seen that revenue receipts
are not increasing consistently and with sufficient pace to realise the
above objectives. Trends of receipts show that during the period
2000-01 to 2004-05, it is likely to go up by around 51 percent. In this,
the credit goes mainly to contributions of the share in union
government taxes and grants from the centre. These together are
expected to increase by 64 percent in the above period while the
increase of state's own revenue (tax + non-tax) is expected to be just
38 percent and that might have been just sufficient to neutralise
changes in price level only.20
            Table 8: Various Indicators as Percentage of Revenue Receipts in Uttar Pradesh




1990-91 15  69 22 15.6
1991-92  7  64 23 17.7
1992-93  9  66 23 17.5
1993-94  9  63 24 17.4
1994-95 15  68 38 23.1
1995-96 15  69 29 21.9
1996-97 20  77 30 25.3
1997-98 28  85 33 26.7
1998-99 50 102 41 31.7
1999-00 34  93 39 30.5
2000-01 25  85 37 30.1
2001-02 24  84 44 32.1
2002-03 18  79 45 25.4
2003-04 (RE) 22   87 53 32.8
2004-05 (BE) 15   80 46 30.8
Source: Government of Uttar Pradesh, Budget Documents.21
           Table 9: Contribution of State & Union Governments in Revenue Receipts of U.P. 
(Rs. crore)




24743.3 25597.9 27821.2 32860.1 37258.6 Revenue
receipts 1+2+3) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
12924.7 12106.4 14680.4 15574.1 17883.8 1. State's own
revenue 52.2 47.3 52.8 47.4 48.0
10980.0 10319.3 12766.9 13707.7 16031.3 (a)Tax
revenue 44.4 40.3 45.9 41.7 43.0
1944.7 1787.1 1913.5 1866.4 1852.6 (b)Non-tax
revenue 7.9 7.0 6.9 5.7 5.0
9045.5 10200.0 10831.8 12595.3 15050.0 2. Share in
union taxes 36.6 39.8 38.9 38.3 40.4
2773.2 3291.5 2309.0 4690.7 4324.8 3. Grants from
the union Govt. 11.2 12.9 8.3 14.3 11.6
Note: Figures in italics are percent shares in total revenue receipts. 22
Consequently, the share of the state’s own revenue in total
revenue receipts in the next five-year period is to go down from
above 52 percent to 48 percent and the share of central taxes and
grants is expected to increase from 48 to 52 percent (Table-9).
Therefore, expectation of the Medium Term Fiscal Reform Policy
(MTFRP) of raising the state's own tax/GSDP ratio to 7.9 percent by
2004-05 is beyond reach as the budget for 2004-05 itself aims to
achieve only 6.8 percent. Further, it was targeted in the MTFRP to
maintain the state’s non-tax revenue/GSDP ratio at 1.1 percent in
these five years. There are many factors responsible for the declining
amount and share of non-tax revenues in Uttar Pradesh.  Net return
from public sector units is only a fraction of 1 percent of the total
investments in these PSUs.  Secondly, there are not only low user
charges but also, due to political expediency, being slashed further.
This also lowers the quality of service and the morale of the
concerned authorities. At the same time, it is not helpful in raising the
quantity and quality of such services. As Table-9 suggests, during the
period 2000-05, in absolute terms non-tax revenue has declined from
Rs. 1,945 crore to Rs 1,853 crore. This is clearly against the
expectation of the Eleventh Finance Commission, which had hoped
that the states would be more successful in collecting non-tax
revenue than the centre (2000; p. 25).  Instead, the ratio of central
transfers to GSDP was higher at 8.2 percent against a target of 7.1
percent. Overall, revenue receipts/GSDP ratio targeted for 2004-05
at 16.0 percent is budgeted to increase to 16.2 percent. Surprisingly,
the state government has not resorted to measures of resource
mobilisation either by increasing tax rates or by widening the tax
base.  For many years, there has been no fresh tax strategy. Worse,
due to administrative inefficiency, realisation of tax with the existing
structure is not satisfactory.  The number of traders registered under
UP Trade Tax Act, the most important tax in the state in terms of tax
revenue, increased from 2.93 lakh in 1990-91 to 3.99 lakh in 1999-
2000 and further to 4.07 lakh in 2002-03.  However, the number of
taxable traders got reduced from 2.61 lakh to 2.00 lakh and further to
1.95 lakh in the respective years.
In this context, we may take note of the observation of B.M.
Joshi that the causes of poor tax collection in the state are internal.
He observes: “The average tax revenue of UP was only 50 percent of
its level in the middle-income states.  Since tax compliance in the
state was relatively poor, the actual tax revenue realised was just
about one-fourth that of the middle-income states” (Howes et. al.,
2003; p. 203).
4,5 This points to another dimension, i.e., of low growth
and output in the economy as well as poor administrative machinery
and weak institutional structure. Both aspects seem to form a vicious23
circle as there is a strong relationship between the two in Uttar
Pradesh. Therefore, it can be safely argued that the state has failed
to mobilise resources within the economy. Moreover, its resource
base is shrinking instead of widening and covering more areas that
lay emphasis on non-tax revenue within the state itself and attempts
to employ new measures and policies to mobilise tax revenue are
entirely missing.
Table 10: Fiscal indicators of Uttar Pradesh 























1995-96 2.0 1.0 0.8 3.8 53.4 0.92
1996-97 2.2 1.0 1.0 4.3 53.6 1.37
1997-98 3.1 1.1 0.9 5.1 61.0 1.75
1998-99 5.1 1.2 0.5 6.8 74.8 2.97
1999-00 
3.9 1.4 0.7 5.9
65.3 2.42
2000-01 
3.6 1.9 0.4 5.9
61.8 1.58
2001-02 3.6 1.9 0.1 5.2 62.5 0.88
2002-03 2.5 1.9 0.3 4.7 53.9 1.21
2003-04
(RE) 9.4 5.4 -5.2 9.6 56.7
* 4.53
2004-05
(BE) 2.4 2.1 0.0 4.4 53.2 -0.46
$
* Leaving Rs. 12,277.40 crore from revenue expenditure,  Rs. 5,906.83 crore
(power bonds) and Rs. 1,000.00 crore (Prime Minister Gram Sadak Yojana)
from capital account outlay.
$: Shows primary surplus.
Deficits and Shrinking Capital Expenditure
The Tenth Five Year Plan of India (GoI, 2202b; Part-III, pp.
13-17) has recorded its concern for growing revenue and fiscal
deficits that have been hindering the prospect of required plan
expenditures and developmental expenditures among the states.
Uttar Pradesh has been placed in `Group C’ because of its low per
capita income. Gross fiscal deficit (GFD) as a percentage of plan
expenditure was 94.0 percent in the Eighth Plan. It has increased to
121.6 percent in the Ninth Plan. Thus, plan expenditure has been
less than the GFD implying fully debt-financed plan expenditures. It
also signifies strain on the state budget on account of poor resource
mobilisation and uncontrolled fixed expenditures. Similarly, revenue24
deficit as a percentage of GFD increased from 44.1 percent to 57.9
percent signifying an increasing compulsion to meet revenue
expenditures through enhanced borrowings.  This ratio is estimated
to be around 54 percent in the first three years of the Tenth Plan.
Analysis of Table-10 is indicative of the direction of fiscal drift
in Uttar Pradesh and the need to discipline the fiscal ad-hocism
persisting in the state for over one decade.  Despite claims and
efforts to trim the revenue deficit, it is still at 2.4 percent in the current
year's budget. Revenue deficit has been accounting for more than
half of the GFD in the economy.  It peaked at 75 percent in the
fiscally most strained year of 1998-99.  But thereafter there appears
to be a trend of moderation that could be capitalised upon through
some increase in the capital expenditure.  The ratio of capital
expenditure to GSDP remained below 1.5 percent upto 1999-2000
but thereafter, it has averaged around 2 percent.  Still, it remains
grossly insufficient. Thus, the persisting high component of revenue
deficit in the GFD obstructs the ultimate target of pruning fiscal deficit
to around 2.4 percent. This does not permit the state to resort to high
capital expenditures and net loans and advances to its other organs
to generate greater productive capacity by way of investments in
infrastructure etc. In fiscal distress, the soft but undesirable option of
reduced capital expenditure to keep the fiscal deficit within
"manageable limit" has been taken. Even so, the fiscal deficit is
above 4 percent whereas in the budget of 2000-01, as a strategy of
MTFRP, the ratio of GFD to GSDP was targeted to be 3.5 percent in
2004-05. However, the current budget itself claims it to be at 4.4
percent. At the national level, while fiscal deficit could not be reduced
drastically, at least there is buoyancy in revenue receipts, control
over expenditures, and sufficient diversification in terms of revenue
receipts.
6 The net outcome of fiscal strain can be seen in the
increased indebtedness of the state.  Primary deficit is showing some
sign of improvement as it is expected to change its direction from
deficit to surplus after a grim situation in the late 1990s that got
moderated in the ensuing years.
Indebtedness of the State
Almost inelastic nature of expenditures, particularly revenue
expenditures, and that of revenue receipts of the state has been the
immediate cause of persisting revenue deficits and negative BCR in
Uttar Pradesh. Revenue deficits have resulted in fiscal deficits that
require to be financed through borrowings. Therefore, all the
borrowings cannot be used for expenditure on capital account. This
in turn has resulted in deepening of indebtedness in Uttar Pradesh.25
Although as shown earlier some fiscal indicators showed sign of
improvement since 2000-01, no such improvement is noticeable in 26

















































































































































































16.1 14.5 52.9 10.4 13.4 6.1 13.8
Figures in parentheses are percent share in total debt stock of a year.
Source: Uttar Pradesh Budget 2004-2005 (Vol. 2(1)); February 2004.27
the case of indebtedness. The ratio of debt to GSDP in Uttar Pradesh
has increased consistently from 31.2 percent in 1995-96 to 34.7
percent in 1999-2000 (Table-11). But thereafter, there has been
sharp increase, as it went up to 41.9 percent in the following year of
2000-01 and is expected to be the highest at 49.1 percent in 2004-
05.
7
In fact, the present debt burden is almost double that of
around 26 percent in late-eighties.  It remained below 30 percent in
early 1990s.  This clearly suggests that the growth of debt burden
has been faster than the growth of the economy.  However, it should
be noted that the rate of annual increase in the debt stock is getting
moderated in the years of the current decade. Thus, increase in debt-
GSDP ratio may also be attributed partially to slow growth in the state
income.  Kripa Shankar (2002; p. 4902) argues that the growing
indebtedness is due to the state not making efforts to raise additional
resources; moreover, deployment of available funds is more for non-
productive purposes than for investment in productive assets. 
The structure of the debt stock in Uttar Pradesh indicates
that the state government, faced with fiscal constraints and political
pressures, is seeking loans from new and more manageable
sources. As a result, although the ratio of all types of debt to state
income has been increasing, it appears that loans from deposits and
advances of state institutions, and borrowings from provident and
pension funds have reached their peak and are not increasing much
in the last five years. These are increasing roughly at the pace of
increase in the state income only. Even the Government of India has
not been a very generous supplier of debt in the above period, as
ratio of borrowings from the Government of India to GSDP has
increased from 10.0 percent in 2000-01 to only 11.0 percent in 2004-
05. Similar has been the trend of small savings. In such a backdrop,
the state has to fall back mainly upon either market borrowings or
financial institutions (Table-11). For the Government of Uttar
Pradesh, in a bid to find new sources of borrowings, financial
institutions have become prominent with the fastest growth rate of
almost 53 percent since 1995-96 and have now increased their share
in total debt stock of the state from less than 1 percent to above 7
percent in recent years.  In contrast, the central government loans
have lost their predominant position.  Although small savings still
contribute the largest amount of debt, their share also is on the
decline in recent years.  The state has shifted focus to market
borrowings that have been steadily increasing share and in the
coming years, these are likely to get a further boost. However, the
pattern of financing the GFD in Uttar Pradesh (as per RBI data)28
indicates that although securities issued to NSSF have been the
largest contributor, their significance is much below that of the same
in the case of all the states taken together.  In Uttar Pradesh, against
the trend relating to all states, the role of market borrowings and
loans by the central government has been much larger. 
Due to increased debt burden and borrowings in the past at
high rates of interest, the problem of debt servicing is snowballing, as
it has increased from 37 percent of revenue receipts in 2000-01 to a
budget estimate of 46 percent in 2004-05. Due to increasing debt
burden and contracting bulk of the debt at high rates of interest, the
ratio of interest to revenue receipts has gone up to above 30 percent
since the late 1990s.  This ratio was only half of this at the beginning
of the nineties.  Average effective interest rate has increased from 12
percent in 1998-99 to 14 percent in 2003-04.  However, due to
participation of Uttar Pradesh in the debt swapping scheme, the
effective rate is expected to scale down to 11 percent in 2004-05.  It
is hoped that at the end of the latter a total debt of around Rs 12,600
crore would stand swapped with new low cost loans.  Debt swapping
with NABARD is also under consideration to the extent of Rs 1,200
crore along with some other loans.  MTFRP of the state had
expected the ratio of interest payments to GSDP to be brought down
to 4.6 percent by 2004-05. However, even by the latest budget
estimates, it would be on the higher side at around 5.5 percent
8.
Significantly, a major portion of the market borrowings have to be
repaid between 2008 and 2010 and these are on rates of interest
varying between 10-14 percent per annum. 
IV. Fiscal Reforms
The fiscal constraints in Uttar Pradesh have been such that
the entire economy has been shaken, particularly since the late
nineties. Similar problems, in varying degree, were noted across the
states.  As a result, since the late nineties, there has been increased
thrust on state level economic reforms, of which fiscal reform forms
an important component.  According to the Tenth Five Year Plan of
India, “The only way for states to relieve fiscal pressures is to
increase all-round tax and non-tax resource mobilisation efforts,
coupled with determined downsising of staff and administrative
expenditure, and taking up fiscal reforms to sustainable basis” (GoI
2002b; vol. III; p. 125).29
Uttar Pradesh has taken up the task of fiscal reforms during
the preceding decade mainly as a result of the initiatives taken by
various arms of the Government of India.  In the recent context, fiscal
reforms in the state may be acknowledged to have begun in March
1998 when the government came out with a White Paper on state
finances.  The central government also pursued the policy of carrot-
and-stick with the states. In June 1999, a MoU was signed with the
Government of India. Uttar Pradesh formulated its first MTFRP
(Medium-term Fiscal Reform Policy) in 2000-01.  Various targets had
been set to be achieved by the end of 2004-05.  These are given in
Box – A along with the likely realisations.  It is clear that the targeted
level of GSDP could not be achieved with a substantial gap of more
than 13 percent.  Fiscal targets also could not be realised as the
state’s own revenue mobilisation remained behind the target.
However, revenue expenditure has been capped to some extent.  But
the three incorrigibles (salary, pension, and interest) have remained
beyond the defined range.  These get manifested in higher revenue
and fiscal deficits, and hence in higher debt burden.
The Government of India has also been making interventions
for promoting fiscal reform among the states by way of providing
incentive funds.  The states would be eligible to receive the same if
they met certain monitorable targets like reducing fiscal deficit to 2.5
percent; bringing down revenue deficit to zero; scaling down interest
payments to 18-20 percent of the revenue receipts; containing
increase in salary and wages within the increase in the consumer
price index or 5 percent whichever is higher; contain increase in
interest payments to 10 percent a year; and to eliminate subsidy
altogether by 2009-10.  It may be argued here that the state of Uttar
Pradesh fails to be eligible to get incentives in respect of many
criteria.  Still, it appears that the salary component has been a source
of some relief.  The Tenth Finance Commission had placed Uttar
Pradesh among the High Fiscal Stress States for its very high ratio of
revenue deficit to revenue expenditures (above 17 percent).
However, there has been some moderation now as the ratio has
been brought below 13 percent in 2004-05.30
Box  A : Review of Major Targets of the MTFRP in Uttar Pradesh
















State’s own revenue    8.9    7.9 Ignores potential of
resource
mobilisation
a. Tax revenue    7.9    6.8 Unexploited,
mismanaged and
poor collection
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(Rs cr) 2,65,045 2,30,295
Growth of the
economy needs to
be taken care of
properly on
sustained basis
Box  B : The Uttar Pradesh Fiscal Responsibility and Budget
Management Act 2004
S.N Items
1. To prepare an MTFRP every year along with the budget with five
year rolling fiscal targets
2. To eliminate revenue deficit altogether by the end of 2008-09
3. To bring down FD/GSDP to below 3 percent by the end of 2008-09
4. To bring down the debt burden and reduce debt/GSDP ratio to 25
percent by 2017-18
5. To manage prudently debt, guarantees and other contingent
liabilities
6. To reorient expenditure policies in such a manner that promote
economic growth, human welfare and poverty reduction
7. To disclose information regarding finances of the state for better
public scrutiny and debate
8. To review fiscal targets half-yearly and discuss the same in the
Assembly
9. To shift ultimately from discretionary fiscal policies to rule based
fiscal policies
Uttar Pradesh has also taken recourse to several other
measures of reform for fulfilment of the goal of taking the state out of
serious fiscal imbalances.  These are in the forms of institutional
reforms, computerisation of important offices like treasuries, and
presentation of budget documents as suggested by the Eleventh
Finance Commission in such a manner that might be convenient for
the public to understand and scrutinise.  Notwithstanding poor
resource mobilisation and imprudent fund management, Uttar
Pradesh now appears to be more committed to fiscal reforms.  This is
reflected in the fact that the state is the fifth one among the states to
begin the second phase of fiscal reforms by passing the Uttar
Pradesh Fiscal Responsibility & Budget Management Act, 2004 in32
February, 2004.  Its salient features are contained in Box – B.  The
latter indicates that Uttar Pradesh has been making efforts to
streamline its fiscal affairs along with promotion of transparency,
objectivity, and responsibility.  However, the state is perhaps
pursuing the path of fiscal reforms under compulsion and not of its
own volition. There is lack of spontaneous and home grown reform
strategy.  This is evident from the fact that although some of the
critical fiscal goals are realised, the real economy has failed to get
energised; this is seen in the subdued overall economic performance.
This implies that the State has not been able to implement fiscal
reforms properly through careful blending of economic dynamism
with fiscal reform. The latter has tended to move away from the
ultimate goal of stirring up the state economy and uplifting the level of
social and economic development in Uttar Pradesh.
V.  Implications for Growth and Conclusion
An analysis of the state finances and of broad economic
indicators in Uttar Pradesh suggests that adopted policies have not
had the desired impact.  The state has been struggling to restore its
fiscal health through various measures of reforms.  It is for this
reason that some of the fiscal indicators seem to have now changed
their course.  For example, there are signs of:
•  reduced quantum of revenue deficits in recent years; 
•  decline in GFD-GSDP ratio; 
•  decline in the rate of increase in salary and interest
payments; 
•  reform in the energy sector; 
•  coming into force of the Uttar Pradesh Fiscal Responsibility
and Budget Management Act, 2004; and
•  constitution of the State Finance Commission twice and in
time.
However, these are neither fully satisfactory nor sufficient
considering the needs and targets of reforms in the economy. We
can argue that there are certain other requirements to provide
momentum to reform, but are beyond the scope of a monitorable
programme of reforms. These include political stability, commitment,
and vision of political leadership, administrative efficiency and
stability, and good governance.33
However, there are many important monitorable targets that
have been framed in the context of Uttar Pradesh and several other
states.  Failure to meet these targets has been affecting the fiscal
health of the state and has implications for growth and development
(economic, social, and human development).  Uttar Pradesh has
failed to increase revenue collection to a desirable level, both tax and
non-tax.  It has also failed to expand the base of revenue collection,
nor could it raise tax rates and user charges, resulting in relatively
low per capita revenue and tax collection.  It has been admitted by
the state government that the tax buoyancy is less than one.
Dependence on devolution of resources from the centre has been
increasing because committed revenue expenditures on salary,
pension, and interest payments are being met less and less from the
state’s own revenue receipts, nor could these be capped. Most of the
fiscal indicators suggest that the state could not achieve the targets
fixed for it in the Medium-term Fiscal Reforms Programme, as the
ratio of fiscal deficit to GSDP is still very high.  This has resulted in
declining capital expenditures that represent investments.  In this
squeesed expenditure scenario that fails to meet targeted plan
outlays on a regular basis, reprioritisation of the budget among
various sectors to promote economic, social, and human
development is hardly feasible.34
Table 12 : Tax Collection and Economic Growth in India and U.P.
                                                           (At current prices)
India Uttar Pradesh
Gross tax revenue Non-tax revenue Own tax revenue Own non-tax
revenue
Year














1996-97 128762 - 32578 - 16.1 6306.0 15.3 1319.5 - 45.0 20.8
1997-98 139221 8.1 38214 17.3 11.9 6998.2 11.0 1291.2 - 2.6 7.1
1998-99 143797 3.3 44833 17.3 15.0 7910.1 13.0 1475.1 14.2 10.7
1999-00 171752 19.4 53211 18.7 10.3 9400.9 18.8 1964.0 33.1 8.4
2000-01 188603 9.8 55947 5.1 8.0 12924.7 37.5 1944.7 - 1.0 4.7
2001-02 187060 - 0.8 67774 21.1 10.2 12106.4 - 6.3 1787.1 - 8.1 8.7
2002-03 216266 15.6 72323 6.7 7.3 14680.4 21.3 1913.5 7.1 7.3
2003-04
(RE)




17883.8 14.8 1852.6 - 0.7 7.6
#
# Obtained through debt stock and ratio of debt/GSDP in Uttar Pradesh.35
         Table 13: Composition of Revenue and Capital Account Expenditures in U.P. 






1.  Total revenue expenditures  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
General services 54.4 39.3 47.3 50.9 48.8
Social services 27.1 22.4 31.3 29.4 29.7
Economic services 15.1 35.8 17.9 16.8 18.0
Compensation & assignments to
local bodies & PRIs 3.4 2.6 3.5 2.9 3.5
Share of revenue expenditure in total
expenditure 89.7 81.6 89.7 89.9 90.5
 2. Capital expenditures  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
    General services 5.4 3.0 8.7 3.6 3.3
    Social services 9.3 3.5 7.6 5.9 8.0
    Economic services 85.4 93.5 83.7 90.5 88.7
    Agriculture & allied 1.0 0.1 15.7 27.8 12.6
    Rural development 10.7 11.8 9.7 7.9 0.4
    Special area programme 7.9 2.7 6.9 4.4 8.4
    Irrigation & flood control 24.8 9.3 19.2 21.7 24.9
    Energy 8.0 53.8 8.8 20.9 23.9
    Industry & mining 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.4
    Transport 33.2 15.4 22.4 6.1 18.1
 Science, technology & environment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
General economic services 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.8 0.1
Share of capital expenditure in total
expenditure 10.3 18.4 10.3 10.1 9.536
Nonetheless, it is important to make at least a modest
attempt to establish a link between poor budgetary measures and
weak economic momentum in Uttar Pradesh with the help of some
fiscal and economic parameters.  As far as tax revenue is concerned,
it is found that the relative growth has been better in Uttar Pradesh
than in India (Table-12).  However, mobilisation of non-tax revenue
has been far better in the latter or to be more precise, it has been
deteriorating consistently in Uttar Pradesh as it has declined even in
absolute values in several years.  Its adverse effect manifested
through poor economic growth of the state economy for a period
longer than the last decade, whereas it has been considerably higher
at the national level.  The pattern of expenditure incurred by the
Government of Uttar Pradesh (Table-13) reveals its helplessness in
providing any meaningful direction and thrust to the economy, as 90
percent of the total expenditure goes out as revenue expenditures
and only 10 percent is left for capital expenditures to push the
economy forward.  Within the revenue expenditure, the share of
general services is gaining way and has increased from 48.8 percent
in 2000-01 to 54.4 percent in 2004-05.  The share of economic and
social services in the revenue expenditures, which are also
considered as developmental expenditures, has shrunk. With limited
share now available for capital expenditure, it is very difficult for the
state government to provide any meaningful direction through its
sectoral allocations.  As a result, important activities like agriculture
and allied services, industry and mining, energy, science and
technology, and environment are being ignored.
Table 14 : Credit-Deposit Ratio, Investments in SSIs, &

















49.2 45.8 28.6 27.2 29.0 29.4 30.4
Investments
in SSIs (Rs. 
crore)
153.5 403.9 399.4 293.5 31.8 272.2
IDBI
# 13.0 - 5.2 5.8 3.7 2.0
ICICI
# 15.4 - 4.0 2.3 4.7 2.4
IFCI
# - - 9.1 5.9 3.4 2.5
NABARD
# 13.5 - 13.8 15.2 15.0 15.4
REC
# 25.2 - 8.5 6.4 - 6.6
LIC
# 9.6 - 7.2 10.7 38.9 -
#: Shows percent share in all-India.37
Overall impact of such vacuous budgetary policy on the
economy may be seen through poor ‘crowding in’ effect on the
private investments over which the state’s Tenth Plan has laid great
emphasis.  Some of the indicators are given in Table-14.  Credit-
deposit ratio has come down to around 30 percent from around 50
percent in the 1980s.  This only shows that resources mobilised by
the banking sector within the state economy are being drained out
due to poor absorption capacity within the economy.  Investments in
the small-scale industries are also gradually dropping since the late
nineties. Similarly, loans by prominent developmental institutions for
carrying out various activities in the state economy have been scaled
down significantly making Uttar Pradesh a poor destination for private
investments.  Surely, this should be attributed to poor demand for
funds from the state economy. Among other reaons, poor budgetary
policy on a sustained basis can be blamed for such a stagnant
situation.  In contrast, budgetary policy should have been an effective
instrument to promote and sustain large private investments in this
backward state economy of the nation.
All the fiscal problems have their impact upon economic
performance.  It is estimated that the expected GSDP (at current
prices) in 2004-2005 would be Rs 2,30,300 crore against a target of
Rs 2,65,045 crore in the MTFRP, showing a gap of over 13 percent.
Already, as shown in the beginning, the Ninth Plan growth target of 7
percent has been missed by more than half.  In the beginning of the
Tenth Plan, growth rate of the economy seems to have dropped
further, considering a target of 8 percent.  It has been claimed in the
Tenth Plan of Uttar Pradesh that the state is short of resources that
can be compensated by private investments.  But this does not seem
to be on the cards.  We have illustrated this gloomy prospect with the
case of low credit-deposit ratio in the state persisting for several
years now at around 30 percent, showing a net outflow of resources
from the state due to lack of fiscal strength, prudence, and
commitment.  It is in this context that the Uttar Pradesh Budget for
2004-2005 did not speak of its achievements in terms of targets of
fiscal reforms attained.  In brief, weak budgetary initiatives have
failed to encourage private investments in the economy leading to
poor growth achievements.  On the other hand, the bleak growth
scenario has been limiting revenue mobilisation measures.  Thus, it
appears that a type of vicious circle has been operating in the
economy of Uttar Pradesh between fiscal policy and economic
growth and development. In fact, among the various fiscal targets set
by the Government of India and other agencies, the state
government managed to attain some of the targets.  But in this
process, the real sector of the economy has been further ignored38
making the budgetary process insensitive to economic and social
development in Uttar Pradesh.
In such a scenario, it has become imperative to aggressively
pursue fiscal reform that can help release forces of growth in the
economy. To begin with, the administration must start the reform
from within by pruning the size of staff and bureaucracy, gearing up
the tax collection machinery and providing quality service through
commitment to earn the confidence of the public.  Expenditure
efficiency should be enhanced.  Only then can one embark upon
revenue raising measures within the state itself by expanding the tax
base and rationalising tax rates.  Special emphasis had to be laid on
increasing non-tax revenue by increasing user charges and gradually
improving the quality of services to shift some of these to the private
sector.  To encourage the private sector to play an active role in the
economy of Uttar Pradesh, the government has to effectively
demonstrate its capabilities to reform itself and develop a sustainable
economic environment with less of political interferences and more of
vision and commitment.394041
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Endnotes
                                                
1.  Despite having almost same growth rate of NSDP during 1990-91 to
1999-2000 (4.04 percent) and 1993-94 to 2001-02 (4.03 percent),
growth of per capita income varied from 1.85 percent in the former
period to 1.66 percent in the latter. This may be attributed to higher
growth rate of population as it increased from 2.15 percent during
1990-91 to 1999-2000 to 2.33 percent in the period 1993-94 to
2001-02. In fact, such a discrepancy might also be due to
population projections between the two census years.
2.  Budget speech of the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh for the year
2004-05: 11 February, 2004.
3. In a very interesting and analytical study, it has been noted by
Robert P. Beschel Jr. that decline in Uttar Pradesh has been more
pronounced in the 1990s and its roots are many.  He observes:
“Chronic political instability and frequent changes in governments
have placed tremendous demands upon politicians for money and
patronage to assure their re-election.  These pressures have in turn
helped erode the boundary between political and administrative
spheres and contributed to three major problems…” (in Howes et al;
2003: pp. 241-242).  He also finds negative relationship between
the growing size of civil service employment in Uttar Pradesh and
its economic performance.   He concludes, “Under such
circumstances, it is difficult to articulate a common vision that can
cross party and caste lines.  It is also difficult to attain the stability
and continuity in tenure necessary to take a reform agenda forward
over time” (p. 245).
4. Taking this point further Kripa Shankar regrets that, “The state has
not cared to mobilise resources and to put them to productive uses.
Per capita tax revenue as a percentage of per capita income in UP
is the lowest among all the states and successive finance ministers
in UP have been taking pride in the fact that no new tax is being
imposed’ (2001: p. 1677).  This also reflects lack of political will to
increase the resource base in Uttar Pradesh.
5. By not making efforts to mobilise resources within the state
economy, we cannot sit idle and expect to gain in terms of
devolution from the centre as per recommendations of the Finance
Commissions, as already states with better fiscal management and
progressive trends find it inconsistent to reward states like Uttar
Pradesh which either indulge in fiscal profligacy or ignore the need
to discipline their fiscal management.
6. On this point, Ajit Karnik (2002: p. 831) disputes the suggestions of
Report on Currency and Finance, 2000-2001 and argues that “in the
given scenario of growing combined fiscal deficit of the centre and
states, it would be better if we emphasise drastic reduction in39
                                                                                                       
revenue deficit and unchanged level of the gross fiscal deficit so
that there is greater scope to invest in socially desirable
expenditures such as investments in physical and social
infrastructure.”
7. Increasing debt burden of the states in India has become a source
of concern in the country.  Therefore, the Twelfth Finance
Commission has been assigned the task of streamlining the
management of government debts as one of the term of reference
by the President of India.
8. For this again, we can blame the low level of output in Uttar
Pradesh because the outline had targeted a gross state domestic
product at current prices of Rs. 2,63,045 crore in 2004-05. But it is
expected to be around Rs. 2,34,700 crore only, i.e., a slip of above
11 percent. In this context, it can also be mentioned that proper
attention is not being paid to projection of GSDP for budget
purposes. As per Budget Documents of 2004-05, in Uttar Pradesh,
implicit GSDP from various sources show differing values. It is
estimated to be Rs. 2,30,295 crore from revenue deficit, Rs.
2,34,735 crore from the debt-ratio and Rs. 2,36,329 crore from
fiscal deficit.  Such variations make an analysis difficult to the extent
various ratios and indicators become incomparable and result in
misleading inferences.